#PYTHON MAC ADDRESS GENERATION MAC OS#
#PYTHON MAC ADDRESS GENERATION FULL#
#PYTHON MAC ADDRESS GENERATION CODE#

You could look through these bytes and look for patterns of repeating bytes, since this is how the header and footer bytes with forblaze tend to work, but a skilled operator could make that more difficult to find than the default. These suspect bytes will still include the actual encrypted payload and nonsense random bytes, which would be hard to distinguish from each other unless you possess the header and trailing bytes specified by Forblaze. If you know where the stego file is, you can begin to extract the suspect bytes after the end of the normal file EOF (so after “FFD9” for jpegs for example). Steganography is pretty difficult to detect. I would recommend changing this like the number of random bytes generated from the default, and changing the default header and footer bytes that forblaze uses to find the payload in the stego file (as well as the length of those header and footer bytes to perhaps be more inconspicious).

As an exercise for the reader, you could also call payload bytes directly vs a URL with some slight modifications to this code. Every other macho I’ve tested works fine, so if you really want to use Go C2s such as Mythic, I recommend crafting a custom macho which can function similar to osascript, and call a jxa payload in memory directly. However, as a warning, this method (based almost entirely on ) will NOT WORK FOR GO COMPILED MACHOS.

#PYTHON MAC ADDRESS GENERATION MAC OS#

Mac OS detections are still pretty poor, especially for in-memory activity.

#PYTHON MAC ADDRESS GENERATION CODE#

compiled_binary COMPILED_BINARY Give the name of the compiled binary to extract the URL and run code in memory from the stego file.

#PYTHON MAC ADDRESS GENERATION FULL#

It is wise to follow strict full paths: /Users//Documents/file.jpg for example. stego_location STEGO_LOCATION You must provide a location on target where the stego file will reside. It must be in the format: -supply_key “圆e圆0x…” – aka two double slashes are needed between each byte, or else it WILL NOT WORK. supply_key SUPPLIED_KEY If you wish to use a specific key, provide it here. url_to_encrypt URL Provide the URL you want to stick inside the compile file. compile_file COMPILE_FILE Provide the path to the C++ file you want to edit. You can change this yourself, just be wary that larger key sizes will add bloat to your payload and are not necessarily going to make your encryption stronger

len_key LENGTH_OF_KEY Provide a positive integer that will be the length of the key in bytes. o OUTPUT Provide the path where you want your stego file to be placed. innocent_path PATH Provide the full path to the innocent file to be used. h, –help show this help message and exit In addition, clang will be used for compilation, and forblaze should be run on a mac so that forblaze can be correctly compiled. Python3 (only tested with Python3.9+), and some associated Python libraries – pip3 should take care of any python dependencies you need. This key can be saved and re-used, with the effect that a different URL could be used to fetch a differ ent payload, and the same compiled forblaze should still be able to execute and process it (provided the header and footer bytes aren’t changed, and the new stego file is uploaded to the correct location.) Forblaze utilizes header and footer bytes to identify where in the stego file your encrypted bytes are, and then decrypts them with a hard-coded key in compile_forblaze.m. It is a slight deviation on my previously built custom encryption for Windows, called Rubicon, and is more simple in practice. It utilizes custom encryption – it is not cryptographically secure, but purely to thwart analysis by AV engines. Using python3, it will build an Obj-C file for you which will be compiled to pull desired encrypted URLs out of the stego file, fetch payloads over https, and execute them directly into memory. Forblaze is a project designed to provide steganography capabilities to Mac OS payloads.

Python mac address generation